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ABSTRACT (112 words) 
This article suggests an institutionalist analysis of monetary capitalism and points to the inconsistency of liberal 
regulation mechanisms. It leans on the characteristics of money in a capitalist economy, often ignored by the 
consensual wisdom but explicitly studied by institutionalist approaches as major concerns in economic evolution. 
The article then shows, in a Minskyian vein, the weaknesses and irrelevance of liberal financial structures with regard 
to the prerequisites of sustainable macroeconomic stability. The main implication is that macro-prudential regulatory 
reforms must be designed and implemented to tame speculative finance. Therefore, market-based self-regulation 
mechanisms must be replaced by public regulation processes that could be framed on two rules: preventive-
constrained finance and preventive-binding funding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Liberalized and opened financial markets are usually assumed to result in positive 
outcomes which would outweigh possible costs. Some ad hoc assumptions such as the free 
market efficiency, open markets self-equilibrium capacity, optimality of a decentralized markets 
based competitive economy, etc. are essential to such a theoretical (but also political and 
ideological) edifice. During the 1980s and 1990s, most economies –advanced as well as emerging 
countries- implemented the so-called financial development and integration policies and 
reformed national financial systems in order to reduce the scope of public supervision and to let 
private institutions and practices based micro-prudential models take the control over the process 
of financial supervision.  
All this work converges toward the same assertion: free and open markets –including 
financial markets- do work in an optimal way without requiring structural public organization and 
management since they have –naturally and spontaneously- all mechanisms and means to self-
adjust and self-regulate if necessary.  
Most policy makers and eminent scholars (to begin with Alan Greenspan who has been 
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006) implicitly or explicitly argued at that 
time that whatever the growing disequilibria and risks markets were able to self-adjust thanks to 
price-quantity changes according to rational agents’ maximizing behavior. In this vein, even in the 
dawn of imminent crises, authorities let free markets do without any preventive intervention to 
correct their exuberances1. They all took a “mess-cleaner” stance more than preventive measures 
at the approach of turmoil. Moreover, numerous crises occurred since then were interpreted as 
crises of transition from State-repressed finance to free-markets-oriented financial systems.  
The 2007-2008 financial crisis which got started in developed financial markets seems to 
point to the irrelevance of such assertions. However, in spite of the systemic characteristics of 
this worldwide catastrophe and related difficulties that several trillion “$/£/€/¥, etc”. of public 
funds couldn’t deal with, the economics profession is still singing the praises of the unregulated 
market system and the balanced budget since the reforms designed and implemented remain 
either very limited or not well fit with regard to the urgent needs of re-regulation of financial 
markets.  
In opposition to the dominant theoretical and political wisdom that mainly rests on the 
assertion that free financial markets are more efficient than publicly organized financial systems, 
the purpose of this article is to prove that financial liberalization and related market-based 
regulation are irrelevant with regard to stability concerns of capitalist economies. Liberal finance 
logically leads to a general financialization of the economy and, accompanied by privatized 
supervision mechanisms, it repeatedly results in cumulated imbalances, systemic crises and 
increasing unemployment.  
To elaborate an alternative relevant analysis of the working of financialized capitalism, a 
specific institutionalist framework is developed through Minskyian premise of endogenous 
financial instability. This analysis maintains that to cope with economic instabilities (national and 
international) public economic management is required as a consistent guidance for economic 
evolution. As it is stated by the institutionalist authors this constitutes “the essence of 
institutional economics”2. Those assertions are presented and supported through two sections.  
                                                 
1 Krugman states (2009: 144) that “(…) Greenspan warned about irrational exuberance, but he didn't do anything about it. And in fact, the Fed 
chairman holds what I believe is a unique record among central bankers: he presided over not one but two enormous asset bubbles, first in stocks, 
then in housing.” 
2 Indeed, in a very institutional vein, Gruchy (1977) wisely maintains that in the face of the turmoil, the logic of economic reform points in the 
direction of some kind of national and international economic management that would provide guidance for national economic systems and that 
this matter constitutes the essence of institutional economics. 
RR2015 « From liberal finance inconsistency to relevant systemic regulation: An institutionalist analysis » Faruk ÜLGEN  Page 3 
 
The first section states the inconsistency of the mainstream wisdom3 (price-oriented free 
markets would lead to economic efficiency and efficient social outcome without tough public 
intervention) and develops the major characteristics of money and monetary capitalism. It then 
shows that monetary and financial rules, mechanisms and markets play a core role leading to a 
complex society that relies on the consistency of institutional patterns which shape actors’ 
behavior and systemic stability. Hence, it is argued that liberal finance dominated capitalism is 
structurally crisis-prone and unsustainable.  
The second section suggests a consistent institutional framework for a relevant regulation. 
The social consistency rests on the institutional design which intends to make relations among 
people sustainable in order to let society evolve in a coherent way. The ingredients of such an 
approach can be found in the early institutionalism that puts the emphasis on the crucial 
importance of monetary/financial relations, of institutions and institutional change, and on the 
issues related to systemic stability through collective action.  
Economic evolution depends upon institutions, usages, and policies and closely related to 
the impact of alternative institutional specifications. The analysis reveals that the recent 
institutional evolution led to the money manager capitalism of Minsky such that economic 
development is entrusted to short-term financial gains producing speculation industry. 
Implications for a system-consistent regulation are then drawn from. It is advocated that the 
alternative rests on the key role of public institutions in economic development. To support long-
term productive engagements which should be designed according to some societal long-term 
targets (employment, environment-friendly, societally sustainable, etc.), private-interest based 
incentives must be removed through two rules: preventive-constrained financial structure (severely 
limited speculative engagements) and preventive-binding funding (involving directly banks/speculators 
into crisis-prevention and crisis losses financing). Therefore, macro-prudential and speculation-
preventing principles must replace micro/self-regulation schemas in order to sharply distinguish 
between finance-to-speculate and finance-to-produce. 
1. FREE MARKETS, FLAWED REGULATION AND MONETARY 
CAPITALIST ECONOMY: AN EXPLOSIVE COCKTAIL   
Financial liberalization finds theoretical support in the mainstream economics whose core 
assumption is the efficiency of market-price mechanisms. Furthermore, this approach usually 
rests on the assumption of neutral money and studies finance as a mere question of equilibrium 
between savings and investment in loanable funds market4. Even though it is recognized that 
financial liberalization might have some disequilibrium effects on the economy at short-run 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003), it is widely asserted that it would have a quality effect in the 
long-run since it should improve credit market’s allocative efficiency (Abiad et al., 2005). 
This led in the last four decades to the implementation of economy-wide liberalization-
(de)regulation policies that modified the structure of financial markets. However, several crises, 
more or less systemic and long-lasting, occurred and, with the extent of the last 20007-08 crisis, 
called into question the relevance of financial liberalism. So in order to understand and then to 
deal with systemic instabilities in a relevant way, an alternative theoretical stance can be 
developed through a specific and accurate analysis of monetary/financial characteristics of 
modern capitalism in an institutionalist-regulationist vein. Such an alternative points to the 
explosive and unsustainable nature of financialized capitalism since the regime of accumulation 
liberal finance results in seems to provoke serious time-inconsistency. 
                                                 
3 Described hereafter as mainstream wisdom, mainstream economics or standard economic theory the neoclassical theory, the neo-Walrasian 
approach, the monetarism, the New Classical economics, etc. which assert that social coordination could be provided by prices when individual 
supply and demand are confronted in the market. On this topic, see Ülgen (2013). 
4 Market-price mechanisms (interest rate changes according to supply and demand from market actors) would let demand for investment meet 
supply of savings and result in steady-state equilibrium without public intervention. For a critical presentation of the loanable funds theory, see 
Bertocco (2013). 
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1. 1. LIBERALIZATION AS A SYSTEM-WIDE DEREGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Although there might exist significant variations in theoretical sensibilities of different 
market-equilibrium or efficient-market approaches, they all assert the superiority of market 
mechanisms over public organization and intervention in the economy to lead society to an 
efficient outcome. This theoretical stance is the cornerstone in the evolution of capitalism 
through a liberalized and financialized economic structure and it remains the main reference in 
researches and political choices, even in period of economic and social turbulences. 
Boyer (2007: 4) remarks that “The adoption of the notion of market economy implies 
that markets are the dominant, if not totally exclusive, mechanisms for coordinating economic 
activity. States, communities, and civil society are a priori excluded and this might be perceived as 
evidence for the limited ambition and, modesty of the economist. But as soon as actual 
observations contradict the hypothesis of self-equilibrating markets, the neoclassical economists 
are prone to attribute the related malfunction to an imperfection with respect to the ideal of a 
“pure” market. Why are such imperfections so widely present, for example for labor and credit? 
Because these markets are embedded into social, political relations that distort the mere pursuit 
of self (economic) interest and the convergence towards an equilibrium. Hence General- 
Equilibrium Theory (GET) is the implicit – and frequently explicit – benchmark in many 
empirical analyses by conventional economists.” 
The mainstream conventional economics indeed maintains that price-oriented free 
market mechanisms would lead to an efficient economic equilibrium and assigns to the state a 
specific role usually limited to some market-friendly economic policies such as conservative 
monetary policies, budget-equilibrium based public expenditures, private enterprises supporting 
fiscal and technological measures, wage-oppressing but rent-enhancing incentives, etc. The 
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers of 1991 states: “Market forces in the financial 
sector channel savings into growth-enhancing investment opportunities; these forces both reward 
and encourage entrepreneurship- the economy's sparkplug. The flexibility of the market-based 
U.S. economy both increases its resilience in the face of disturbances and enhances its ability to 
make the most of new opportunities” (Economic Report, 1991: 22). In the last decades this 
became a scientific mantra: “economics got the right answer: free market policies, supported but 
not encumbered by the government, deliver growth and prosperity” (Schleifer, 2009: 135). This 
“New Consensus Macroeconomics” (Arestis, 2009) that advocates financial liberalization is a 
kind of synthesis among different models mainly related to neoclassical and new classical efficient 
markets assertion, developed in modern terms in the work of E. Fama, among others. It is worth 
noting that this paradigm is fundamentally non-monetary since money and financial variables do 
not play any core role in economic evolution (Ülgen, 2014a).  
This paradigm maintains that free markets do self-adjust when they are submitted to 
various shocks 5  as they are assumed to contain efficient self-regulatory mechanisms 6 . The 
corollary is that there is no need for public regulation in markets. Hence, new financial reforms 
and policies evolve, from the late 1970s, toward the deregulation of financial markets in favor of 
micro-prudential supervision mechanisms. Therefore banks and other market actors such as 
rating agencies are let provide their own models and mechanisms of evaluation of their own 
market activities. The state and its agencies are less involved in market supervision and intervene 
at the end of the process, if necessary, in order to save the day and calm down systemic panics 
without any preventive framework and constrained regulation.  
As it is maintained that financial liberalization would enhance the opportunities for 
smoothing out the effects of real shocks and promote competition and efficiency in the financial 
                                                 
5  Those shocks are usually studied as external shocks since it is assumed that (competitive and not State-disturbed) markets do work at 
equilibrium. 
6  In the pure general equilibrium model, this can be reduced to the standard flexible price mechanism under the arbitraging process of 
decentralized individuals’ supply and demand. 
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sector, most economies (advanced as well as emerging economies) opened up and liberalized 
their financial markets in the 1990s and 2000s to get more integrated into international capital 
circuits. But they also experienced monetary and financial crises. The dominant wisdom 
interpreted those crises as some problems of transition and bad public management. However, 
with the worldwide systemic crisis of 2007-2008, this assertion revealed erroneous since even 
financially developed market economies failed to be efficient self-equilibrating systems (Ülgen, 
2015). Instead of stability, economies experienced cumulative imbalances and recurrent crises. 
Instead of growth, economies continue to suffer recession periods. More than six years after the 
beginning of the crisis, unemployment is increasing and persistent, recovery policies fail to give 
economies a sustainable growth path, public debts and deficits are increasing and most 
economies implement conservative-austerity policies which prevent “animal spirits” from setting 
out to conquer the future.  
The crucial error lies in a theoretical but also political will that leave no room for specific 
analysis of insolvency and illiquidity concerns in financialized capitalism and it is still advocated 
that the relevant institutional framework should rest on market-friendly institutions and related 
incentives: “The economic theory behind this stance is powerless to suggest a relevant alternative 
to its own futile beliefs because there is no room, in real economic equilibrium theory, for 
specific analysis of sophisticated financial structures and related insolvency concerns that a 
capitalist economy can generate in its own evolution. So, such a theoretical and political direction 
is irrelevant with regard to the characteristics of capitalism which is a monetary economy where 
real equilibrium has no meaning and where treating money as a secondary variable (a mere veil) 
without any long-term influence over real variables results in poor and weak understanding of 
capitalism that prevents any relevant attempt to improve its working.” (Ülgen, 2014a: 16).   
1. 2. CAPITALISM AS A MONETARY ECONOMY AND 
ENDOGENOUS FINANCIAL INSTABILITY  
The identification of the characteristics of systemic crises is of paramount importance in 
order to design crisis-preventing policies and consistent market organization. This requires a 
relevant identification of the characteristics of capitalist economies, how do they function, what 
are the core variables that determine the range of individuals and markets behavior, what are the 
viability conditions and sustainability limits of societies, how do collective/public institutions 
intervene in order to support those conditions and limits, how might markets be regulated to 
reach a globally stable situation, what could consistent accumulation regimes be and how could 
they be regulated to improve the systemic resiliency of economies, etc. With regard to these 
concerns, it is possible to develop an institutionalist-regulationist approach which maintains that 
capitalism is a monetary economy in which monetary and financial structures (rules, regulatory 
design, related policies, incentives, etc.) are essential systemic constituents and must be studied 
and framed more thoroughly than it is usually done in the mainstream economics. Hence two 
major pitfalls of the mainstream economics appear to be crucial obstacles that prevent the 
economics profession and the policy makers (that the profession advises) from taking relevant 
decisions and implementing sustainable economic policies that would be consistent with the 
needs and characteristics of our modern societies. The first is that although capitalism is 
fundamentally a monetary economy where money, monetary rules and relations, financial markets 
and regulatory devices do matter more than any other economic concern, the mainstream 
economics does not (cannot) take into account this aspect of capitalism and then, it cannot deal 
with the economic problems of our societies. Second pitfall, corollary to the first, is that capitalist 
economy is not a (real) equilibrium economy. Its decentralized (private and separate individuals 
decisions based and no centrally planned) and monetary nature makes it evolve on uncertain, 
real-time related and continuously changing development path. In such an economy, markets do 
not have any spontaneous self-adjustment mechanism. Consequently, as Keen (2011:358) wisely 
states: “We have to start with foundations from which the phenomena of reality emerge naturally 
by constructing monetary models of capitalism built on the melded visions of Marx, Schumpeter, 
Keynes and Minsky.”  
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Capitalism is indeed a complex society that requires specific institutions such that its 
evolution relies on the consistency of institutional patterns that shape private as well as public 
actors’ behavior and determine systemic stability. In this institutionalist-regulationist vein, Becker 
et al. (2010) argue that regulationist approach seeks to explain how endogenous contradictions of 
capitalism can be stabilized through specific structural regimes of accumulation. This issue is 
obviously related to the monetary nature of capitalism and makes that a given regime of 
accumulation evolves through a specific institutional environment where financial relations (rules, 
mechanisms and markets) play a central role to let private agents take decentralized strategic 
decisions. 
Actually, in capitalist economy economic activities rest on private and decentralized 
decisions of separate individuals or groups. These decisions determine entrepreneurial activities 
and need to be financed to become effective. Consequently, the realization of market activities is 
closely related to the possibility of financing entrepreneurs’ expectations. This is what Ülgen 
(2013) calls “prime relationships” established on debt contracts between two private agents, bank 
and entrepreneur/enterprise which imply creation of credit money resulting from the constraint 
of financing (access to money) for any economic activity. Hence various debt relations involve 
bank credit and financial intermediation between enterprises and financial sector. In a private-
ownership based society, the debt-financing process obviously relies on private units’ will and 
expectations about uncertain future profits. At this level of analysis, a very crucial aspect of this 
schema must be noted: “However, one of the characteristics of a monetary economy is that 
private debts circulate throughout the economy like money without the agents receiving it being 
able to distinguish the issuer. These agents consider it as a sign conveying framework rules for 
their economic community” (Ülgen, 2013: 181). 
From this perspective, it appears that money has a peculiar twofold nature in a capitalist 
economy: it is transversal and ambivalent.  This twofold nature continuously generates tensions 
between the private sphere and the public sphere. At the same time, the raison d’être and the 
viability domain of money/monetary system rest on its capacity to manage such tensions. Aglietta 
(2003: 11) then argues that in a monetary capitalist economy: “monetary organization should 
contain a tension caused by the uncoordinated decentralization of private initiatives. Money is 
both the support for private wealth and the social link that gives coherence to exchanges by a 
posteriori constraint of settlement.”   
Money is transversal since all economic transactions rely on monetary relations: “Monetary 
and financial problems do structurally matter to all other sectors through the changes of 
strategies of the credit-money providers (banks) and financial intermediaries. Hence, changes in 
money/financial markets affect the whole economy irrespective of decision units which are or are 
not involved in debt relations” (Ülgen, 2014b: 263). Money is also ambivalent as it is related both 
to private decisions and public rules. Its creation lies in private decisions of banks and 
entrepreneurs that rest on their own profit expectations. At the same time, its general use and 
validity as a means of payment and general settlement depends on non‑individual, public rules7.  
This peculiar perspective leads us to maintain that even in a decentralized and private 
decisions based capitalist economy, money is a social institution, a set of social rules that allow 
private economic units to undertake free, decentralized and debt-based activities. Such debts 
circulate as money -means of financing and means of payment- through the entire economy and 
thus involve the entire society. At the same time, the viability8 of the capitalist accumulation 
process lies in the systemic possibility to validate the debt structure by the realization of expected 
profits since credit money is granted to individuals under a specific debt-contract for a 
determined period of time, mainly between a borrower and a bank. This debt must be reimbursed 
according to the terms of the contract. Although enterprises can borrow credit-money from 
                                                 
7 For a general presentation of a monetary system called payments system in capitalist market economies, see Ülgen (2013). 
8 Viability can be defined as the capacity/ability of an economic system to deal with systemic crisis situations without calling its major principles, 
rules and values into question. 
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banks to finance their private-expectations-based activities they cannot repay their debts by 
issuing new debts on themselves. The reimbursement of debts through the respect of 
common/objective constraints gives debt-money-relations eminently social/constrained 
character. However, in such a non-ergodic economy there is no guarantee to validate the societal 
compatibility of separate decisions/actions to reach a socially efficient equilibrium. Hence, the 
working of the economy requires some collective rules and mechanisms to organize and guide 
private actors’ strategies with respect to systemic rules that should be able to let money play its 
twofold nature. All this makes that stability relies on strongly interconnected decisions and 
behavior of separate actors and markets. Stability is thus a systemic (macroeconomic) concern 
and must be thought of as such.  
2. AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO FINANCIAL 
INSTABILITY AND REGULATION 
A very specific characteristic of institutionalism lies in its basic assumption about the 
meaning of the economics. Institutionalists define the economics as the study of the nature of the 
social process -beyond the ad hoc neoclassical market equilibrium assumptions- with focus on 
institutions in the working of capitalist economy. That is the institutional consistency –the social 
organization that frame individual decisions and actions- which determines the capacity of the 
economy to evolve on a stable path. Market-based micro-regulation schemas are not assumed to 
be sustainable in time because of the systemic contradictions they result in. Those contradictions 
are related to the monetary characteristics of capitalist market economies and make that relevant 
regulation -required for systemic stability- does rely on macro-prudence directed framework. 
Therefore, a fruitful research agenda with regard to capitalist finance instability seems to be an 
alternative institutional analysis of the capitalist economy in a Minskyian vein.  
Minsky (1992) relates financial instability to the monetary characteristics of capitalism as 
he states that financial instability and the characterization of the economy as a capitalist economy 
with expensive capital and sophisticated financial system go together.  Minsky (1982: 66) then 
documents: “The tendency to transform doing well into a speculative investment boom is the 
basic instability in a capitalist economy”. Put into an institutionalist perspective, Minskyian 
analysis might offer a relevant analytical guide to characterize the major weaknesses of 
financialized capitalism and to point to some basic principles for consistent regulatory reforms 
that could prevent systemic financial exuberances and subsequent painful adjustment processes. 
2. 1. ROAD TO ENDOGENOUS INSTABILITY  
Consensual wisdom argues that private-initiative-limiting restrictive regulation cannot 
enhance financial soundness and maintains that supervision mechanisms must rely on private 
monitoring of banks through sound contract enforcement systems. From the 1980s, a specific 
institutional environment -financially deregulated-liberalized capitalism- involves actors in new 
market strategies. Banks are incited to enter into more speculative engagements and develop 
securitization products and processes (the transactional banking). Such an evolution feeds a new 
regime of accumulation which is based on speculative financial gains and transforms financing 
relations into Ponzi schemes à la Minsky (Minsky 1986). In the aftermath of the dotcom burst, 
from 2003 till 2007/2008 crisis, especially the US economy but also most developed banking and 
financial systems contribute to develop a bubble environment based on real-estate-related debt 
leveraging in search of capital gains (Hudson, 2010). Then the money manager capitalism (Wray, 
2011) enters the picture and determines the society’s economic horizon. In such an economy, 
some particular elements, partly related to the regulatory changes implemented in the last 
decades, point to endogenous instability of deregulated/liberalized financial markets and to the 
irrelevance of market-based financial supervision.  
First, the liberal regulation fuels the decline of financial stability especially through the 
privatization of the process of banking and financial supervision. From the 1990s onwards and in 
spite of recurrent financial turmoil in advanced and emerging economies, the role played by 
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private rating agencies in the evaluation of the soundness of banks and financial intermediaries 
gained strength and became the main/dominant way of “social assessment process” of financial 
markets. Parallel to this, the “internal ratings-based” self-evaluation procedures let banks use their 
own risk estimations to calculate regulatory capital they should hold. In a specific document the 
Basel Committee (2001) offers its proposals for an internal ratings based approach (the IRB 
approach) to capital requirements for credit risk.  
Those assessment methods do leave the social checking process of monetary and related 
financial activities of private agents to agents’ (banks and rating agencies) own discretion and 
logically create a kind of structural conflict of interest. On the one hand, internal self-evaluation 
amounts to give a candidate also the role of assessor. Two opposed and separate positions, the 
role of the judge and the position of the judged are confused and any objective 
prerequisite/constraint -necessary to validate the social character of such a judgement process- 
isn’t imposed. On the other hand, as rating agencies intervene in a twofold way, first as specialists 
and advisors which work hand in hand with banks to elaborate and commercialize different 
financial products and processes in markets (financial innovation); and second as social assessors 
that should remain external to banking engagements and completely separate from banks. 
Obviously those market-based self-regulation models provoke de facto confusion between the 
business of advice and the mission of assessor. Furthermore, this sort of (necessarily self-
interests-related) self-regulation is unable to counterbalance crisis-prone behavior of markets 
since it does usually generate pro-cyclical movements as it fuels financial engagements during the 
periods of euphoria and abruptly stops asset price increase during the periods of turmoil (Sy, 
2009). Such a pyromaniac tendency rests on the logic of individual rational and conservative 
strategies. 
Second, there is no bridge between individually rational decisions and macroeconomically 
consistent coordination in a capitalist economy. This means that the sum of the so-called 
individual rational strategies does not result in a socially consistent macroeconomic situation. 
This problem is called the fallacy of composition and can be used to argue that market-prices 
based decentralized coordination systems are not able to ensure a globally stable economic 
situation and may (do) often result in systemic crises that cast doubt about the ability of a 
capitalist market economy to survive its endogenous instabilities. Systemic macro situation 
cannot be observed but a posteriori such that individually rational/efficient decisions do not 
obviously lead to an optimal economic system. With regard to this argument, Minsky (1991) 
points to the fragile posture of micro-rationality and subjective probabilistic risk calculations that 
ignore the true nature of the world. Such a decision mechanism contributes to increase fragilities 
and to prepare the roots of future instability. In this sense, even if micro behavior can 
subjectively transform uncertainty into risk in the private decision process this does not reduce 
potential systemic instability at a macroeconomic level. Rational micro decision units cannot deal 
with system-wide macro concerns that are generated by the addition of separate and 
uncoordinated actions.  
The crucial difference between what it seems to be efficient at individual level (the micro-
rationality) and what would be efficient at the society’s level comes from –at least- two 
characteristics of decentralized economies. First, the micro-rationality is based on private 
information and expectations and given the complexity of the world around them, separate and 
private individuals or groups are not able to continuously collect, process and use all the required 
information and corresponding relevant behavior in real time. They then take decisions in an 
uncertain (non-ergodic) world and can only worry about their micro-environment. Even if they 
would think of macro concerns, they could do it only in a micro-rational way (if one supposes 
that they are able to be micro-rational at any time). Second, from an individual perspective, 
nobody has interest to contribute to macro-stability by disciplining her/his opportunistic 
strategies when there is no social constraints centralizing, managing and supervising individual 
profit-seeking private decisions. Clark (1919) notes that social and individual valuations cannot be 
the same because the range of alternatives open to society is different from that open to 
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individuals: “The individual may escape from costs that society has to bear, or vice versa; the 
individual may choose under the pinch of want or under bad bargaining conditions, when it is 
not socially necessary that he should be confined to such a stern choice of evils” (Clark, 1919: 
287-288). In a similar vein, Olson (1965: 2) states that “If the members of a large group rationally 
seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group 
objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so (…) These points hold true even when 
there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving 
it.” 
From this point of view some implications may be drawn for systemic stability. There is 
obviously an overwhelming (logical) opposition between self-interest and self-assessment based 
micro-regulation and system-wide organized and globally consistent macro-regulation. The latter 
is naturally in a prudential purpose and takes individual constituents as different parts to be 
arranged in order to give the whole system sustainable consistency while the former does aim, by 
definition (given above), at determining and evaluating the factors that could affect individual 
situations (financial institutions, banks, enterprises, etc.) 9 . Micro-regulation dominated 
supervision systems mainly rest on self-monitoring and legal incentives to ensure regular 
disclosure and accountability. Whatever the supervision mechanisms implemented by public 
authorities over micro decision units, in a micro-prudential schema the incentives fail to prevent 
short-sighted individual behavior that evolves within a very limited horizon of decentralized 
private expectations. So macro-stability is a systemic concern resting on sustainability/viability 
issues of the whole system which are beyond the individual knowledge and processing capacity. 
2.2. RELEVANT REGULATION  
From an institutionalist perspective it seems to be relevant to give public institutions 
(such as government, central bank, supervision agencies, etc.) a crucial role in the design and 
implementation of sound financial systems and related regulatory structures since the cornerstone 
of capitalist economies -monetary/financial framework- cannot be built up and consistently 
managed through private-interests based market relations. The major characteristics of capitalist 
market economies require the organization and implementation of a system-consistent 
environment to be framed through collective objectives and constraints. Institutional economics 
precisely appears to be an appropriate approach to deal with today’s major economic issues since 
it assumes that in capitalist economies monetary/financial rules, mechanisms and markets play a 
central role. Veblen (1919: 89) notes the dominant role of money and finance in the economy by 
stating that the discretionary control over the real economy came to vest in the captains of 
finance, the masters of financial intrigue “who are highly skilled in the haggling of the market”.  
The consistency of the monetary/financial system’s organization and related institutional 
patterns shapes actors’ behavior and determine systemic stability (Commons, 1931). Institutions, 
as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 
2006), frame human activities and then “make up the economic order” (Hamilton, 1919). The 
rationale for sanctioning institutions and constrained rules does rest on their role to enforce 
outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations (Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl, 
2009). Their durability also matters as they allow actors to have stable expectations of the 
behavior of the others by offering a continuum of choices and social relations (North, 2003). 
Rutherford (2010: 50) argues that “what institutionalism offered was an invitation to detailed 
study and participation in the intelligent direction of social change”. Gruchy (1989: 860) notes 
that the question of economic reform plays a central role in institutionalism that mainly focuses 
on the problem of “the kind of economic system that may be more serviceable to the community 
than is present day capitalism”.  
                                                 
9 The dominant regulation and forecasting models mainly rely on equilibrium hypotheses through the use of partial equilibrium models (ceteris 
paribus -everything else remaining constant- statement) or dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, derived from microeconomic 
principles and assuming that agents do maximize their utility/profit functions at their individual level and prices do adjust until markets clear. It 
is worth noting that these models basically rest on nonmonetary neoclassical real equilibrium hypotheses. Money and financial variables are 
added to these hypotheses as supplementary (and secondary) parameters. 
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However, even in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 worldwide catastrophe, the recovery 
policies have not been accompanied by sound regulatory reforms to change incentives and rules 
in financial markets in order to strength institutions and reduce crisis-provoking and crisis-prone 
market activities. As Boyer (2013: 136) states: “the strong resurgence of liberal orthodoxy played 
a decisive role in blocking the reforms that are needed to restore the viability of financial systems 
and their contribution to a return to growth. Reference to Keynesian interventionism was 
therefore short-lived, and far from marking the beginning of a new era.”  
For instance, even though Financial Stability Board (2010) advocates that regulation 
should be designed to reduce market reliance on ratings, it also maintains that private sector risk 
management practices should involve appropriate internal expertise for credit assessment. This 
consensual wisdom focuses on slightly removing market reliance on rating agencies and 
strengthening information disclosures without calling into question the “flawed principle” of 
market-friendly micro-regulation. Epstein, Plihon, Giannola and Weller (2009: 142-143) note that 
despite the economically and socially terrible consequences of the current crisis “most 
governments in the Europe and the United States have chosen to return, for the most part, to the 
status quo ante. This consensus appears to be forming among the G-20 governments along the 
following lines. First, governments should exert relatively little formal control over the financial 
institutions that they have heavily invested in. Second, governments should develop an “exit 
strategy”, which effectively means they should clean up the balance sheets of these banks and 
then re-privatize them as quickly as possible. Third, financial regulation should be strengthened 
somewhat, so that privately owned financial institutions do not expose the world’s largest 
economies to the risk of major financial crises. At the same time, though, these regulations 
should not be so strong that they create inefficiencies and stifle “financial innovation” ” 10 .  
Consequently current regulatory reforms do not seem to be able to prevent the next systemic 
crisis, and yet several researches exist on the topic and point to different experiences and possible 
alternatives. I cite below only a few of the many important contributions to the analysis of 
financialized capitalism crises and required regulatory reform. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009: vi) argue that the prevention of crises in the banking system is 
more important than in the case of other industries (because of the aforementioned monetary 
nature of the economy) and document that: “The current approach to systemic regulation 
implicitly assumes that we can make the system as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that 
individual banks are safe. This sounds like a truism, but in practice it represents a fallacy of 
composition. In trying to make themselves safer, banks, and other highly leveraged financial 
intermediaries, can behave in a way that collectively undermines the system.”  
Ugeux (2014) remarks that in the last decades the financial system became source of 
macro instabilities and as the global market expands, the need for international regulation 
becomes urgent. Bresser-Fereira et al. (2014) maintain that in the aftermath of the 2007-08 crisis, 
developing countries suffered less thanks to some tighter financial and regulation policies they 
implemented after several decades of crises they lived. Arestis and de Paula (2008) show that 
there is little relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth, even in emerging 
countries.  
The impressive (and comprehensive) volumes edited by Dymski, Epstein and Pollin 
(1993), Epstein (2005), Wolfson and Epstein (2013), and Hein, Detzer and Dodig (2015), among 
others, thoroughly study -in the case of advanced as well as emerging economies- the process of 
transformation of capitalism into a finance-dominated system. Those works document that the 
liberalization process undermines growth through its distorting effects on economic structures 
and everyday life of people. Logical implications point to necessary alternative regulatory reforms 
in order to lead financial markets to finance productive long-term activities and then put 
economies on more economically and socially sustainable and positive development path. 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that in this “process of liberal finance recovery”, losses are socialized through the privatization of public funds. This 
obviously poses the very embarrassing question of the meaning of our today’s democracies. 
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Whatever the core arguments developed in different analyses, lessons converge toward 
modifications in the institutional structure of financial markets and tougher macro-prudential 
regulation is advocated in order to supervise and control the working of markets.  
To cope with crises and their destructive consequences and give markets a positive role in 
economic evolution, redesigning financial regulation is indeed a systemic prerequisite. Central 
banks and related public supervision agencies must act as social organizers of financial markets 
and frame markets through the visible hand of the public power in order to design financial 
regulation at the systemic and global level in coherence with the core characteristics of monetary 
capitalist economies.  
In this aim, macro-prudential regulation principles must be substituted to micro-
regulation schemas as they are related to factors that affect financial system’s stability as a whole. 
A relevant regulatory framework must take into account different facets to the process of 
regulation such as structural/economic regulation (about the financial market’s structure and 
competition), conduct regulation (concerning private actors’ behavior), social regulation 
(consumer and labor protection) and societal regulation (collective objectives, development 
issues, etc.) to tame speculative short-sighted finance (Ülgen, 2014c). However, this would result 
in abandoning the ongoing market-friendly regulatory reforms and the belief that self-regulation 
might lead agents to system-consistent behavior.  
The ultimate challenge for regulatory policies is to implement societal efficiency-seeking 
public interventions and then make decentralized individual decisions and actions socially 
consistent according to collective objectives. More precisely, societal consistency of a financial 
system rests on its capacity to prevent speculative banking/finance and to serve job-creating 
productive needs. An alternative societal efficiency paradigm should be substituted to the 
consensual market (economic) efficiency criterion, and lead to reshape alternative rules, policies 
and incentives according to society’s common objectives that should aim at improving the 
wellbeing of citizens in the entire society. From this perspective, financial stability must rest on a 
broader concept of societal stability including macroeconomic stability, political stability as well 
as cohesive and inclusive stability. This requires a kind of “finance without financiers” (Epstein, 
Plihon, Giannola and Weller, 2009). The design and implementation of such an environment 
obviously require transparent and democratic governance, as open and supra individuals as 
possible beyond local and group interests11. In this case, regulation will not appear as a restrictive 
external constraint over free individuals but as a means to strengthen society’s foundations and 
cohesion among citizens with respect to common objectives, rights and duties that aim at 
preventing harmful out of control strategies of financial institutions.  
Alternative regulatory principles might consist of separating securitization and productive 
sphere financing activities. Even if banks can create branches in these two sectors, their 
engagements should be clearly separated with regard to their balance-sheet positions such that 
when a securities market specialized branch has difficulties, the productive sphere financing 
branch would not have balance-sheet links with her and would not be directly impacted by such 
disequilibria. Parallel to this proposition tougher capital and liquidity requirements and severely 
limited speculative engagements could be implemented. That is the rule of preventive-constrained 
financial structure which would be not conducive to systemic interconnectedness among individuals 
and institutions able to lead to financial degeneration. To create strong incentives to direct banks’ 
decisions through less fragile and less unproductive engagements, it could be judicious to increase 
charges and commitments for banks’ activities as zero or punishment bonus-minus system and 
unlimited liability partnership. That is the rule of preventive-binding funding to directly involve banks 
and speculators into preventive funding and crisis losses financing.  
                                                 
11 Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the organization of a suitable legal and regulatory environment must not 
necessarily rely on a kind of omniscient technocratic staff à la Galbraith or Veblen. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see Baker and 
Widmaier (2014). 
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Obviously, those regulatory measures must be accompanied by regular public evaluation 
of banks’ activities (for instance, every two years) with respect to their contribution to the 
realization of societal objectives. Market-based assessment systems must then be replaced by 
objective public oversight mechanisms in order to prevent conflict of interest and to enhance the 
impartial character of the rating and supervisory processes in the name of society. From this 
perspective, the organization, supervision and assessment of banking activities would be related 
to the objective of realization of societal long-term targets even though banks would remain 
private and capitalist enterprises. The regulation would concern the social utility of banks and 
societal incentives would replace private-interest based hazardous incentives. 
CONCLUSION 
This article argues that to cope with crises and their destructive consequences and to give 
markets a positive role in economic evolution redesigning financial regulation is a sine qua non. 
However, it shows that alternative financial reforms must take into account the core 
characteristics of monetary capitalist economies where money displays a twofold nature; it is 
ambivalent and transversal. Therefore money and related financial relations (rules, institutions, 
markets) reveal to be in a cornerstone position in market economies. Since the working and the 
sustainability of economic relations deeply depend on the monetary and financial framework in 
force, the organization and the supervision of monetary and financial markets cannot be built up 
and consistently managed through private-interests-based market mechanisms. It seems to be 
relevant to give non-market public institutions a core role in the design and implementation of 
sound financial systems and related regulatory structures. Such a framework requires the 
organization of a system-consistent environment that must be thought according to collective 
objectives and constraints. This approach finds a fruitful analytical anchorage in institutionalist-
Minskyian theory which maintains that the consistency of monetary and financial organization 
and related institutional patterns does shape actors’ behavior and determine systemic stability. 
Therefore, this article maintains that the social consistency of the financial system rests on 
its capacity to favor growth-enhancing operations and to prevent speculative banking/finance. 
This requires tighter macro-prudential regulation in order to supervise and control the working of 
markets. A relevant regulatory framework must take into account different facets to the process 
of regulation such as structural/economic regulation, conduct regulation, social regulation and 
societal regulation. The main implication of such an analysis is that financial stability is a systemic 
and collective concern which must be produced and managed through macro-regulatory 
frameworks. Consequently, the survival of capitalism depends on the abandon of the belief that 
self-regulation might lead markets to system-consistent behavior, and on the implementation of 
two basic rules: preventive-constrained finance and preventive-binding funding. Those 
conditions require tough reforms to sharply distinguish between finance-to-speculate and 
finance-to-produce.  
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